Listen to the AudioBook: The Ethics of Aristotle by Aristotle

The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle

By Aristotle

ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS

BOOK I

1. Every art and every enquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, seems to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. Hence the good has been accurately stated to be that at which all things aim.

2. Therefore there must be some end of the things which we do. If there were no end at all, the first impulse to action would be idle and vain, and all subsequent impulses would likewise be idle and vain, as there would be no final goal.

3. But as there seem to be many actions, arts, and sciences, there are correspondingly many ends; but as we have admitted that there are some things which we choose as means to others—for example, money-making to wealth, and the art of fire-making to the construction of a ship, and other arts to some other end—while in the case of all things that are pursued as ends in themselves there is something common to them all, which is the first cause of their being pursued, this common object will clearly be the good, and the best of all goods.

4. Therefore this must be the good of that which studies this very thing, namely, politics or the science of human affairs. For this science regulates what sciences shall be studied in the cities, and what each man shall learn, and up to what point; and we see that this science makes use of the practical sciences, and further enacts also what men shall do and what they shall abstain from doing: its end, therefore, will embrace the ends of the subordinate sciences, and in regard to mankind, this end will be the good for man.

5. Although the good may be the same for a man and for a city, nevertheless the good of the city is evidently greater and more perfect to attain and preserve; for to secure the good for one man is something desirable, but to secure it for a nation or for cities is a nobler and more divine thing.

6. This, then, is the good for man, which is the object of the science of human affairs. We must, however, attempt to ascertain this first; for the good of one man is the good of the city, and the good of the city is no more the good of the man, but rather the good of the city is something greater and more perfect.

7. Let us then state what is the nature of the good we are seeking. It must be something final. If there is some end of all that is done, this will be the good, or else one of the goods, of which this is the end.

8. So it is for this reason that the good is the final end. Let us call it the end (telos).

9. What, then, is the highest good in the sphere of action? It is generally agreed that it is happiness (eudaimonia). But what is happiness? Living well and doing well.

10. What kind of life, then, shall we say is happy? For the life of the sensualist is the life of gratification, but we have seen this to be slavish, fit only for beasts. The life of political activity involves honour, and honour depends on those who give it rather than on him who possesses it; but the good we are seeking is something that belongs to a man and cannot be taken away from him. Moreover, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may persuade themselves of their own goodness; so that clearly they think that virtue is higher than honour.

11. The life of contemplation, again, will be considered later. Let us first examine the life of action. The life of action, as a life of virtue, seems to be the life of the good man.

12. But the life of virtue seems to have many forms. We must therefore ask what is the best kind of virtuous action. Perhaps we may say that the best life is that which results from the highest virtue, and this virtue must be the most perfect virtue.

13. The highest virtue, then, is the virtue of the best part of us. The best part of us is reason, or the rational element. Therefore the highest good for man is a life in accordance with the highest virtue, which is the virtue of reason, i.e., contemplative activity.

14. But such a life, while it is the best, may not be the life that is natural to man. Man has also a sensitive and an appetitive part. Therefore the happy life must include the satisfaction of these parts as well, provided that such satisfaction is compatible with the life of reason.

15. We must consider whether happiness is to be found in leisure or in activity. For leisure is itself a kind of activity, and contemplation is the highest form of it.

16. Let us postpone the discussion of the contemplative life and consider the life of moral action, which is the life in accordance with practical virtue. We must first define virtue.

17. Virtue, then, is a state or disposition (hexis) to behave in the best possible way, or a state that enables a man to do his best, and to do it well.

18. The virtues are divided into two classes: moral virtues and intellectual virtues. The moral virtues arise from habit, the intellectual virtues from teaching.

19. The moral virtues, such as courage, temperance, and justice, are acquired by performing the corresponding actions. We become just by doing just acts, brave by doing brave acts, temperate by doing temperate acts.

20. The same applies to the arts: for the things which we have to learn to do, we learn by doing them, e.g., house-building or lyre-playing. Those who actually do them become craftsmen or musicians.

21. Moral virtue, then, is the result of habit, and the same is true of any kind of virtue. For the several virtues are produced in us naturally, as it were; for we are by nature capable of acquiring them, and we perfect them by habit and training.

22. The virtues are neither natural to us nor wholly against nature. We are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.

23. This is shown by the laws also; for the lawgivers make the citizens good by habituating them to good conduct, and this is the aim of every legislator: and those who do not achieve this fail in their object; and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.

24. The acquisition of virtue is similar to the acquisition of any art. The disposition to act rightly is the result of the habit of doing so.

25. We must consider, then, what is the nature of virtue. It is concerned with feelings and actions. In these we are said to be good or bad.

26. And if virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, it must be concerned with what is intermediate or mean, as we say that the brave man is intermediate between the coward and the rash man, and the temperate man between the intemperate and the insensible man.

27. Similarly for the other virtues also. Virtue is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency.

28. For example, courage is the mean between fear and rashness; temperance is the mean between intemperance and apathy; and liberality is the mean between prodigality and meanness.

29. This is not the only thing that makes a state a virtue, but it is a mark of it. For virtue is a mean, but not every mean is a virtue. It must be the mean relative to us, that is, relative to the individual.

30. A mean state is relative to us, as the master of carpentry is relative to the carpenter. The mean is not one and the same for all men, nor is the mean in the work one and the same for all. For example, what seems to be a moderate amount of food for a professional runner might be too little for a man of a different build, and too much for one who is not an athlete.

31. The mean, then, is relative to the individual. But, speaking generally, the mean is what is intermediate between the extremes, with reference to the thing itself.

32. Virtue, then, is a mean state, as being intermediate between two states of vice, one characterized by excess and the other by deficiency, and these vices are such as to be contrary to each other. Virtue is due to a kind of mean, and it is a mean relative to us.

33. Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this mean being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.

34. Indeed, it is not easy to perform the mean action, for in all things it is hard to find the mean. For instance, not everyone can find the center of a circle, but only the expert. So too, anyone can feel anger, fear, or joy, or wrong others, or be too extravagant or too prodigal; but to do these things to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, is not easy, and is not for everyone.

35. Hence it is that virtue is rare, and praised, and happy, and worthy of honour, and productive of all the highest blessings.

36. A man is called good because he possesses virtue. The highest virtue is the virtue of reason, which is contemplation.

37. The happy life, then, is the life of virtue. And since virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral, the happy life must involve both. But the life of contemplation is the highest life, because it involves the highest virtue, which is reason.

38. The truly happy man, then, is the one who is active in accordance with complete virtue, and who is also adequately supplied with external goods; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. Many actions require instruments, and friends, and money, and good birth, and good children; and an orphan or a friendless man, or one with bad children, or who is deformed, cannot be called fully happy.

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